PAKISTAN ZINDABAD

Editorial: 27 Years After Chagai – Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence Faces a Doctrinal Crossroads

Twenty-seven years after Pakistan’s nuclear tests at Chagai, the nuclear shadow still looms large over South Asia — but with a troubling twist. While Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has successfully deterred full-scale wars, India’s calculated reliance on limited conventional strikes has emerged as a serious doctrinal challenge, demanding a clear and adaptive response.

The latest clash, marked by India’s “Operation Sindoor” on May 7, saw a coordinated assault deep inside Pakistani territory. Airstrikes, drone swarms, and missile attacks targeted everything from religious sites to military installations. Pakistan’s response was swift and resolute, downing multiple Indian aircraft — including Rafale, Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and Su-30 jets — in under an hour. Yet, instead of de-escalating, India doubled down.

This repeated pattern of limited incursions — reminiscent of India’s 2016 “surgical strikes” and the 2019 Balakot episode — reveals the tightening space for deterrence in a region bristling with nuclear weapons. Each new strike tests the edges of Pakistan’s resolve, with India betting it can operate in the “grey zone” below the nuclear threshold, inflicting pain without triggering all-out war.

For Pakistan, the stakes couldn’t be higher. The policy of “quid pro quo plus” — adopted after 2016 — has so far managed to prevent an all-out conflict. But as India’s risk-taking grows bolder, it’s clear that this approach alone is not enough to close the door on limited aggression.

Experts agree that Pakistan’s challenge lies in addressing this new phase of conflict, one dominated by multi-domain warfare: drones, stand-off missiles, and rapid precision strikes that compress decision-making windows to mere minutes. Former federal minister Dr Shireen Mazari warns that the March 2022 BrahMos missile incident in Mian Channu, which India called a mistake, was likely a deliberate test of Pakistani response time — a chilling sign of how these new technologies heighten the risk of miscalculation.

Compounding this risk is the extremist Hindutva mindset that currently shapes India’s political and security establishment. Electoral pressures and the need to project strength drive New Delhi to push the envelope, confident that nuclear escalation can be avoided. But wars rarely stick to scripts — and a single error or misunderstood signal could unleash catastrophe.

Pakistan must now grapple with whether to adapt its doctrine to deter these limited incursions or continue to rely on retaliatory strikes after each episode. Strengthening conventional capabilities — from modern fighter jets to advanced air defences — is critical. So is embracing other tools of leverage, from cyber capabilities to economic measures, to make any Indian strike too costly.

Moreover, as Air University’s Dr Adil Sultan argues, the future of conflict in South Asia will be more intense, complex, and short — demanding rapid, integrated responses across all domains, with the PAF at the forefront.

But perhaps most crucially, Pakistan must reaffirm its red lines clearly and credibly. The nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, but it alone cannot stop every drone or missile. Instead, Pakistan must ensure that any move towards nuclear escalation is seen as a shared nightmare no sane actor would dare unleash.

As we mark 27 years since Chagai, Pakistan’s nuclear shield still holds firm. But it now stands at a doctrinal crossroads. To ensure that South Asia’s nuclear shadow continues to deter rather than invite conflict, Islamabad must rethink, adapt, and above all, remain resolute in defending its sovereignty — without being dragged into the abyss.